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A RESOURCE-BASED THEORY OF MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN
University of Groningen and University of Durham
CHRISTOPHE BOONE
University of Antwerpen
We argue that combining the insights from both the industrial organization and
organizational ecology perspectives is likely to produce value added. We develop a
resource-based theory of market structure, where resources pertain to the environ-
mental assets (together forming the resource space) without which a firm cannot
operate viably. We propose that the distributive shape of the resource space, together
with the presence or absence of exploitation economies, molds market structures in
terms of density and concentration. Our theory unifies many unconnected strands of
theory in the organization sciences domain.
The issue of market structure figures promi-
nently in firms’ boardrooms and societies’ court-
houses, being a key element in decisions about
competitive strategies and antitrust interven-
tions. Indeed, market structure, referring to
firms’ composition of an industry in terms of
their mere number and size distribution, is cru-
cial in understanding the processes and out-
comes of competition. An industry’s market
structure is both a consequence and a determi-
nant of competitive rivalry. The number of firms
(density) and their size distribution (concentra-
tion) are inextricably bound up with the compet-
itive rules of the game in any industry. Both
extreme cases—perfect competition among a
large number of small price-taking firms and
natural monopoly of a large price-setting firm
that single-handedly dominates the market—
are self-explanatory in this respect. So, logi-
cally, theories of market structure focus on three
key issues: (1) What determines market structure
features? (2) How does market structure influ-
ence competitive behavior (and vice versa)? (3)
How does market structure evolve over time?
Two branches of the organization sciences
particularly stand out for their production of a
large number of theory fragments that deal with
such market structure issues. First, industrial
organization (IO)—an economic theory of market
competition—scholars have developed an im-
pressive stock of knowledge as to the specifics
of competitive rivalry under a large variety of
circumstances (Schmalensee & Willig, 1989; van
Witteloostuijn, 2002). Second, organizational
ecology (OE)—a sociological theory of popula-
tion evolution—scholars have produced an
equally impressive number of longitudinal stud-
ies on the evolution of a large variety of indus-
tries (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan & Free-
man, 1989). As yet, however, an integration of the
accumulated body of theory fragments is just
starting to emerge through the stepwise buildup
of a stock of crossover studies (Boone & van
Witteloostuijn, 1995, 2004; van Witteloostuijn,
2000). An example of a cross-fertilizing effort is
“ecological” game theory, in which IO’s mathe-
matical apparatus is applied to OE issues (van
Witteloostuijn, 1998; van Witteloostuijn, Boone,
& van Lier, 2003).
By and large, however, IO and OE have been
developed separately. Our key argument in this
article is that combining insights from both per-
spectives is likely to produce value added. In
this context, a promising integration vehicle is
the resource concept. In the domain of organiza-
tion sciences, the core concept of a number of
well-established theories is this very notion of
the resource; four notable examples are the re-
source-dependency theory of the organization
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the resource conceptu-
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alization of niche-width fitness (Freeman & Han-
nan, 1983), the resource-based view of the firm
(Wernerfelt, 1984), and the resource-partitioning
framework of OE (Carroll, 1985). Along similar
lines, a resource-based theory of market struc-
ture and organizational form can be developed,
where resources pertain to the environmental
assets (together forming the resource space)
without which a firm cannot operate viably.
Such a resource-based theory will tie together
the many strands of theory currently uncon-
nected in the organization sciences domain. Ad-
ditionally, the resource-based perspective pro-
duces a number of new ideas that may prove
helpful in future empirical work.
Our general argument is that the characteris-
tics of the resource space, together and in inter-
action with the presence or absence of exploita-
tion economies (i.e., scale or scope economies),
determine firm behavior and ultimately market
structure. Different market structures are tradi-
tionally described by means of the number (den-
sity) and the size distribution (concentration) of
firms in the market. These two dimensions of
market structure are not indicative, however, of
the underlying organizational diversity and
types of firms that are likely to prosper under
different resource space and exploitation econ-
omies conditions. Because markets with other-
wise similar densities and concentration levels
might hide very different competitive condi-
tions, we also analyze the relative fitness of
organizational forms under different resource
space conditions, in line with OE’s well-estab-
lished focus on issues of organizational diver-
sity (e.g., see Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2002, 2003).
We concentrate on two organizational forms
that received much attention in prior OE re-
search: generalist and specialist (Carroll, 1985;
Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The joint focus on
market structure and relative fitness of organi-
zational forms in equilibrium—the combination
that we call “market form” in the remainder of
the paper—offers a richer description of the par-
ticular market under study than traditionally
provided in much IO work. We argue that these
market forms are molded by, and intricately re-
lated to, the characteristics of the resource
space and the presence or absence of exploita-
tion economies in a predictable way.
The stepping-stone of our theory is a typology
of four ideal-type market structures, combining
the density with the concentration concept. Sub-
sequently, we sequentially deal with the fea-
tures of the resource space, exploitation (scale
and scope) economies, and the characteristics of
different organizational forms. Next, we put
these theory pieces together to produce an
ideal-type typology of resource space/exploita-
tion economies–market structure/organizational
form linkages. Figure 1 summarizes the three
key building blocks of our resource-based the-
ory of market form.
The contribution of the paper is fivefold. First,
we offer a mapping exercise, systematically
linking IO and OE insights. Second, we put re-
source space features center stage in a theory of
market form equilibrium (IO) and market form
evolution (OE). Third, we enrich IO by introduc-
ing the organizational form concept from OE.
Fourth, we extend OE by incorporating equilib-
rium reasoning from IO. Fifth, we offer a theory
that provides insight into the structural anteced-
ents of competitive strategy options and the im-
plications for organizational performance. All
this, finally, cumulates in a plea for in-depth
empirical industry studies on resource-driven
industry evolution.
We provide three preliminary remarks. First,
the argument below takes the IO- and OE-
related perspectives as the stepping-stone for
theory construction. Second, in so doing, the im-
pressive stature of both perspectives implies
that this article cannot do justice to their de-
tailed richness. In the current context, however,
this straw man type of device is instrumental in
focusing on the key issues.1 Third, since IO is
full of rather technical jargon that is not easy for
noninsiders to comprehend, we explain IO ter-
minology (printed in bold in the main text) in
footnotes throughout the text.
MARKET STRUCTURES
Leaving the well-known industry boundary is-
sue aside, the structure of a market refers to the
number and size of the firms that supply a well-
defined set of (in)tangible products to a client
group. Basically, market structure is defined by
market concentration and organizational den-
sity.
1 We focus here on theory. Schmalensee (1989) and Baum
(1996) are just two examples of reviews of the impressive
stocks of empirical evidence in IO and OE, respectively.
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Concept 1 (market concentration):
Market concentration pertains to the
relative importance of the mass (i.e.,
aggregated size) of the larger firms in
a market.
Concept 2 (organizational density):
Organizational density refers to the
number of firms in a market.
Market concentration relates to the (non)skew-
ness of the firm size distribution by, for example,
measuring the aggregated market share of the
top four firms in a market (the so-called C4).
Organizational density is simply the total num-
ber of firms, unweighted for their size, in a mar-
ket. Clearly, IO and OE are highly complemen-
tary, since scholars of both have been and still
are studying issues of concentration and den-
sity, albeit by applying different theoretical
lenses.
Ignoring the many hybrid variants, four ideal-
type market structures can be distinguished by
dichotomizing both market structure features in
high and low categories. Additionally, the IO
theory associates market structure with firm
conduct (van Witteloostuijn, 1992). The combina-
tion of market structure and firm conduct speci-
fies the competitive rules of the game (Scherer &
Ross, 1990). For example, in the symmetric
duopoly setting with product homogeneity and
unbinding productive capacities, cutthroat Ber-
trand competition2 (i.e., price-setting rivalry) is
likely to emerge. Under such circumstances, po-
tential clients are only interested in low prices,
since the products offered by both duopolists are
identical. Then, tit-for-tat price undercutting will
determine the rules of the competitive game,
2 Bertrand competition is one of the two best-known
game-theoretic models, the other one being Cournot compe-
tition. With Bertrand competition, the assumption is that
firms compete by setting prices, rather than quantities
(Cournot). A well-known benchmark case of competition is
Bertrand rivalry with perfect product homogeneity and non-
binding productive capacities. With perfect product homo-
geneity, only price matters to the demand side of the market.
That is, a customer buys from the cheapest producer, even
for infinitesimal price differences. As a result of nonbinding
productive capacity, each firm can potentially serve the
whole market as a monopolist. Basically, with these as-
sumptions in place, even a Bertrand duopoly will feature
cost prices and zero profits in equilibrium, as a result of
tit-for-tat price-undercutting behavior.
FIGURE 1
A Resource-Based Theory of Market Form
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provided that each producer has sufficient pro-
duction facilities to serve the whole market as a
monopolist. Table 1 lists the four ideal type mar-
ket structures, with the IO-derived rules of the
game in parentheses.3
1. Dual market structure. Dual market struc-
tures feature a market center with large
(dominant) generalist firms that tolerate a
small-firm specialist market fringe. The OE-
related resource-partitioning framework
(Carroll, 1985) emphasizes the scale-driven
competition for the market center, whereas
IO’s modeling of escalating commitment4
(Sutton, 1991) focuses on the differentiation-
oriented rivalry among dominant oligopo-
lists (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 2004).
2. Concentrated market structure. Concen-
trated market structures are associated
with oligopoly (and, in the extreme, monop-
oly) industries in which a limited number of
large firms strategically compete for the at-
tention of the industry’s demand side. The
game-theoretic analysis of oligopolistic be-
havior5 is modern IO’s core (Tirole, 1988),
involving a virtually uncountable number
of instances of specific-case modeling (van
Witteloostuijn, 2002).
3. Fragmented market structure. Fragmented
market structures are typical for the classic
case of perfect competition, which features
a large number of small price-taking firms
that seek survival in homogeneous product
industries. Perfect competition,6 which has
been generalized as the n-firm case of per-
fect contestability7 (Baumol, 1982), is the tra-
ditional benchmark case in economics’ gen-
eral equilibrium theory8 (Novshek &
Sonnenschein, 1987).
3 Clearly, concentration and density are not totally inde-
pendent. Two examples may illustrate this. First, with den-
sity (n) being 1, the C1 index is 100 percent by definition.
Second, with firm symmetry, the Hirschman-Herfindahl in-
dex (which is the sum of squared market shares) is 1/n.
4 Escalating commitment is a type of competitive behav-
ior that is explored in dynamic game theory. In its simplest
form, this is modeled in a two-stage game. In the first stage,
firms decide on whether to sink an investment in, for exam-
ple, advertising or R&D. In the second stage, given the in-
vestments of the first stage, firms compete in the product
market, setting either prices (Bertrand) or quantities
(Cournot). The first-stage investment game is said to esca-
late if the end result is an overinvestment such that the
associated sunk cost can only be viably carried by a small
number of firms.
5 Oligopolistic behavior refers to the strategic interaction
among a limited number of larger firms. In this case, the
firms are large enough to directly influence the market,
which implies a deviation from perfect competition and con-
testability. Hence, firms anticipate and react directly to what
(they expect) rivals (will) do. Market concentration is high
and organizational density low. Modern game theory has
been and still is extensively applied to model oligopolistic
behavior, assuming that oligopolists primarily compete with
quantities (Cournot) or prices (Bertrand). The basic model is
extended by adding a wide variety of complexities (e.g.,
asymmetric information, R&D investment, or multimarket
collusion).
6 Perfect competition is the traditional benchmark of neo-
classical economics. With perfect competition, many small
firms are subject to auction-like taˆtonnement processes that
determine equilibrium quantities and prices at the market
level. That is, all firms are too small to have any direct
influence in the marketplace. Market concentration is very
low and organizational density very high. Firms passively
decide on the quantity they bring to the market. Assuming
free (i.e., costless) entry and exit, the result is zero-profit
prices, which maximize static welfare.
7 Perfect contestability generalizes perfect competition by
developing an argument that produces zero-profit price out-
comes, irrespective of organizational density. The argument
relies heavily on the free entry assumption. Even a monop-
olist will be forced to set zero-profit prices in the face of a
dominant threat of free entry. If equally efficient clones are
hanging in the wings, incumbent firms cannot engage in
any form of monopolistic behavior, because this will trigger
devastating hit-and-run entry. Basically, this is the extreme
case of Bertrand competition, but now with potential rather
than established competition. The key assumption is that
sunk cost is zero, implying costless exit—and, hence, a dom-
inant threat of hit-and-run entry.
8 General equilibrium theory is the mathematical analy-
sis of a complete set of markets—complete in the sense that
this set of factor and product markets is assumed to repre-
sent the economy as a whole. The focus of general equilib-
TABLE 1
Four Ideal-Type Market Structures
Concentration
Density
High Low
High Dual market structure (fringed oligopoly) Concentrated market structure (pure oligopoly)
Low Fragmented market structure (perfect
competition)
Uniform market structure (monopolistic
competition)
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4. Uniform market structure. Uniform market
structures are characteristic ofmonopolistic
competition9 (Hotelling, 1929), which im-
plies that a countable number of nondomi-
nant firms differentiate their products in or-
der to obtain sustainable positions in
industries with quality- and/or taste-sensi-
tive clients. Under the umbrella name of
horizontal10 or vertical product differentia-
tion11 rivalry, a large number of specific
cases of monopolistic competition have
been analyzed (Eaton & Lipsey, 1989).
RESOURCE SPACES
Market structure and firm conduct are co-
determined by the underlying features of envi-
ronmental resources. This does not imply that
determinism rules the business world alto-
gether. For example, which firms are bound to
flourish and which resource-exploiting devices
are coming to the fore are both largely a matter
of managerial discretion. However, this volunta-
rist element leaves intact the observation that
overall market structure patterns are the prod-
uct of the boundaries imposed and the opportu-
nities offered by environmental resources. If this
type of resource-based reasoning is applied to
the four ideal-type market structures, a general
resource-based theory of market structure
emerges. First, however, before such mapping
exercises can be performed, we need to develop
ideal-type resource spaces on the basis of key
features of environmental resources. For our cur-
rent purpose, we focus on the following features
of the environmental resource space: (1) whether
the resources are homogeneous versus hetero-
geneous and (2) whether the resource distribu-
tion has a center or not.
Concept 3 (distributive heterogeneity
and homogeneity): The distribution of
environmental resources may be dis-
persed so that different niches can be
observed, or it may reveal a concen-
tration of similar resources (distribu-
tive heterogeneity and homogeneity,
respectively).
Concept 4 (resource space center): When
resources are heterogeneous, the distri-
bution may or may not reveal a single
peak or multiple peaks, implying that
niche sizes are unevenly distributed or
of similar size, respectively.
A revealing example of the distributive fea-
ture of the environmental resource space is lo-
cated at the market’s demand side. On the one
hand, if buyers focus on price differences only,
then product homogeneity—and, thus, environ-
mental resource homogeneity—rules the mar-
ket. IO examples of product homogeneity theo-
ries of market rivalry are perfect competition,
cutthroat Bertrand oligopoly, and perfect con-
testability (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982). In
OE, generalist competition for the market center
comes closest to this type of rivalry (Carroll,
1985).
On the other hand, if buyers discriminate
among different products according to nonprice
features, then product heterogeneity—and, thus,
environmental resource heterogeneity—deter-
mines the rules of the competitive game. IO the-
rium theory is on issues of social welfare. The key contribu-
tion of general equilibrium theory is that linkages across
markets are taken on board. For example, what is the impact
on welfare if one market is liberalized into perfect competi-
tion while other markets maintain imperfectly competitive
structures?
9 Monopolistic competition emerges if firms offer products
that slightly differ in terms of their location in product space,
implying an assumption of imperfect product homogeneity.
As a result, monopolistic competition deviates from perfect
competition because each firm can benefit from local mo-
nopoly power. Monopoly power is limited, though, by com-
petition from neighboring rivals. The degree of monopoly
power depends on the distribution of demand and supply
over product space, as well as cross-product elasticities.
10 Horizontal product differentiation games deal with is-
sues of product variety competition. In such games, product
varieties are assumed to be different, but not so different
that they do not compete for the same type of demand. A
horizontal product differentiation game is associated with
two key assumptions. The first one specifies the set of po-
tential products and the costs associated with producing
any of them. The second defines the distribution of custom-
ers, defined by their income levels and product preferences.
Together, both assumptions drive the outcome in terms of
equilibrium products and prices.
11 Vertical product differentiation games deal with quality
competition. That is, the assumption is that firms offer the
same product, differing from one firm to the other only with
respect to quality. This implies that if two firms offer this
product at the same price, customers will buy the highest-
quality one. If customers differ in their willingness to pay,
then different price-quality combinations will survive in
equilibrium.
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ories of product heterogeneity rivalry are all in
the realm of horizontal or vertical product differ-
entiation competition (Eaton & Lipsey, 1989), the
classic cases being Hotelling’s model (1929) of ice
outlet competition on a sunny beach and Lancast-
er’s (1979) n-dimensional conceptualization of
product space. In OE, Carroll’s (1985) resource-
partitioning theory is a nice example, assuming a
unimodal (or multimodal) resource distribution
with a peak (or peaks) and a tail (or tails).
Of course, though, the distribution of re-
sources is not restricted to demand and product
features, as is clear from the emphasis on social
structures in the OE-related literature. For in-
stance, the distributive characteristics of sup-
ply-side productive capital (e.g., in terms of hu-
man labor, physical equipment, and raw
material) are equally important. Take the illus-
trative case of the auditing industry (Pennings,
Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998). In this profes-
sional services industry, the survival chances of
any firm are highly dependent on the human
capital features of the auditing associates and
partners, implying that the human capital dis-
tribution in the labor market shapes market
structure evolution (Maijoor & van Witteloos-
tuijn, 1996).
By combining the environmental resource dis-
tribution features described in Concepts 3 and 4,
the three ideal-type resource spaces presented
in Table 2 and Figure 2 emerge, again putting
aside the many hybrid cases. Additionally, for
the sake of simplicity, we restrict our discussion
to unidimensional resource spaces (for multidi-
mensional examples, see Pe´li & Nooteboom,
1999, and Boone, Carroll, & van Witteloostuijn,
2002). That is, for the sake of clarity, both re-
source space features are dichotomized into
their discrete counterparts.12 Note that homoge-
neous resource spaces cannot have a center by
definition. This is why NA appears in the middle
column of Table 2.
1. Condensed resource space. A condensed re-
source space (Figure 2a) is characterized by
a high concentration of similar resources
(homogeneous resources). An example is
the natural gas market, where buyers have
undifferentiated preferences for gas for use
in cooking, electricity, or heating.
2. Rectangular resource space. A rectangular
resource space (Figure 2b) is composed of a
set of dissimilar resource pockets or niches
without a dominant center. An example is
the Chinese or Indian carryout market,
where each carryout counter serves a small
local market defined by geographical dis-
tance.
3. Tailed resource space. A tailed resource
space (Figure 2c) features a relatively re-
source-abundant center of similar or related
resources, surrounded by tails of dissimilar
and relatively scarcer resources. An exam-
ple is the American beer brewing industry,
consisting of a large market center of con-
sumers of mass-produced beer and smaller
pockets of demand for a variety of specialty
beers.
EXPLOITATION ECONOMIES
In IO terminology, the environmental resource
space is the demand side that is to be exploited
or served by the supply side, which comprises
organizations that occupy viable locations in
this resource space. A crucial supply-side fea-
ture is the benefit and/or cost of resource exploi-
tation (Teece, 1980), particularly scale and scope
(dis)economies.
Concept 5 (scale economies and dis-
economies): The exploitation of envi-
ronmental resources may or may not
permit firms to benefit from cost-
economizing or revenue-generating
large-scale production of a single
product.
12 An obvious candidate for specifying the theory’s re-
source space characterization in greater detail is resource
space mass and how this relates to equilibrium firm density.
Market size (or, in OE terminology, carrying capacity) im-
poses an upper bound on the resource space’s exploitation
potential, which subtly interacts with the minimum efficient
scale in determining market structure.
TABLE 2
Three Ideal-Type Resource Spaces
Distribution Center No center
Distributive
homogeneity
NA Condensed resource
space
Distributive
heterogeneity
Tailed resource
space
Rectangular
resource space
NA  not applicable, since a homogeneous resource dis-
tribution has no center by definition.
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Concept 6 (scope economies and dis-
economies): The exploitation of envi-
ronmental resources may or may not
permit firms to benefit from cost-
economizing or revenue-generating
large-scope production of a multiprod-
uct portfolio.
Scale and scope (dis)economies may derive
from regulatory, positional, or technological
(dis)advantages. Scale cost economies are de-
termined by cost advantages that come with the
large-scale development (R&D scale), produc-
tion (manufacturing scale), and selling (market-
ing scale) of a single product, where learning
economies derive from cumulative size over
time (in whatever [combination of] functional
activities). An example of a scale benefit is mar-
ket power: a firm that size-dominates the market
can sustain high price-cost margins by taking a
Stackelberg leadership13 role (von Stackelberg,
1932). Scope economies pertain to the benefit
and/or cost advantages that are associated with
the combined production and selling of a port-
folio of different products. A scope cost advan-
tage is, for instance, any cost reduction that
comes from the multiproduct sharing of input
resources (such as shared raw material and pro-
duction machinery). A benefit advantage from
scope may be, for example, derived from (1) mul-
timarket branding by transferring a strong
brand name from one market or product to the
other, (2) joint R&D that generates new process
technologies or product features that spill over
from one market or product to the other, or (3) the
competition-dampening threat of mutual for-
bearance (van Witteloostuijn & van Wegberg,
1992).14 OE adds sociological mechanisms to
standard IO-type sources of exploitation dis-
economies, such as conspicuous consumption
(Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 2002) and net-
work status (Podolny, 1993), that constrain a
firm’s capacity to extend its activities success-
fully into the market’s periphery.
Baumol et al. (1982) introduced a sophisticated
IO cost theory. Their so-called contestability (or
sustainability) analyses nicely unravel the con-
sequences of scale and scope (dis)economies in
single and multiproduct facilities. In this con-
text, a key concept is the minimum efficient
13 Stackelberg leadership is a variant of oligopolistic be-
havior where one of the firms is the first mover. That is, in
the illustrative case of a duopoly, the market leader i de-
cides on prices (Bertrand-Stackelberg) or quantities
(Cournot-Stackelberg) before follower j does so. Then, leader
i decides while taking j’s profit-maximizing reply into ac-
count. Modern Stackelberg models endogenize leadership,
analyzing which firm will turn into a leader given the rules
of the game and the features of all firms.
14 Clearly, the exploitation (dis)economies notion is
closely related to the IO concepts of entry barrier, sunk cost,
and strategic commitment (van Witteloostuijn, 1992).
FIGURE 2
Condensed, Rectangular, and Tailed Resource Spaces
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scale or scope (MES).15 The MES defines the
firm’s overall scale (or scope) of operation at
which the total unit cost of developing, produc-
ing, and selling the (portfolio of) product(s) is
minimized. In a resource-based interpretation,
therefore, scale (dis)economies pertain to the
cost-benefit structure of exploiting a bundle of
similar resources (e.g., producing a single prod-
uct), whereas scope (dis)economies refer to the
cost-benefit features of operating a set of differ-
ent resources (e.g., producing a variety of prod-
ucts). Clearly, a subtle tradeoff may arise if dif-
ferent exploitation (dis)economies introduce
opposing forces (Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klem-
perer, 1985).
An illustrative case is the production and mar-
keting of natural sugars and artificial sweeten-
ers. From the demand side, the potential of
scope economies hints at the combined market-
ing of sugars and sweeteners, since both prod-
ucts satisfy related utilities (the taste for sweet-
ness). From the supply side, however, the food
processing of sugar beets or canes is completely
different from the chemical production of artifi-
cial sweeteners, which may produce cost disad-
vantages in the spheres of production and R&D.
Only by assessing the precise nature of both
opposing forces can the overall MES be deter-
mined.16
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Based on the widths of their niches or market
postures, two generic organizational types are
distinguished within OE: generalist and spe-
cialist (Carroll, 1985; Hannan & Freeman, 1977).
This typology of organizational forms is partic-
ularly interesting for the present resource-based
theory, since it classifies organizations on the
basis of the strategies they use regarding re-
source utilization and positioning in resource
space. A specialist organization occupies a nar-
row niche in resource space by tailoring prod-
ucts or services to a small range of very specific
customer tastes (Carroll, 1985; Hannan & Free-
man, 1977; Pe´li & Nooteboom, 1999). In IO, the
typical firm in the product differentiation litera-
ture is a specialist (Thisse & Norman, 1994). The
many brew pubs in the American brewing in-
dustry are good examples of specialists. Other
examples are high-premium car producers, such
as Bentley and Rolls Royce, which basically of-
fer a limited range of models targeting the very
well off. A generalist organization, in contrast,
aims its products or services at a broad range of
consumer tastes in the market, being the coun-
terpart of the specialist in niche-width theory
(Freeman & Hannan, 1983). Such organizations
basically want to build market share and max-
imize market reach.
Within the IO-inspired strategic management
literature about industry analysis, specialists
might be thought to pursue a focus business
strategy, whereas generalists would have a
broad competitive scope (Porter, 1980). It should
be recognized that a generalist strategy could
be accomplished in two ideal-type ways:
through a single-product or multiproduct strat-
egy. Single-product generalists do not customize
their offer to specific client segments in the mar-
ket but, rather, focus on making a single stan-
dardized product or service with a broad appeal.
In IO, this type of generalist is omnipresent in
single-product oligopoly theory (van Witteloos-
tuijn, 2002). Multiproduct generalists concen-
trate on tailoring their output to the specific re-
quirements of different segments. In IO, this
type of generalism is reflected in the multimar-
ket or the multiproduct oligopolist17 (Bulow et
al., 1985). Staying in the brewing industry, it is
fair to say that Anheuser Bush and Heineken
come close to the ideal-type single-product gen-
eralist. Renault (automobile industry) and
15 Minimum efficient scale or scope (MES) is defined with
reference to the production function. In the single-product
case, the MES is the lowest production volume at which total
average cost per unit of production is minimized. Then, the
MES is determined by the absence or presence of scale
economies or diseconomies. In the multiproduct case, the
MES is the lowest production volume for a set of products at
which per-unit cost is minimized. Here, the MES follows from
the nature of scope (dis)economies.
16 This type of reasoning is central to the large body of
literature on diversification, a seminal IO contribution being
Berry’s (1975).
17 A multiproduct oligopolist is a firm that produces a set
of products that are connected through synergetic demand
and supply considerations. On the demand side, the prod-
ucts may be complements or substitutes. On the supply side,
the products may decrease or increase total costs if their
joint production is associated with scope economies or dis-
economies, respectively. Depending on the features and
strategies of competitors, these issues determine the multi-
product oligopolist’s profit-maximizing product portfolio.
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GlaxoSmithKlein (pharmaceutical industry) are
good examples of multiproduct generalists.
The distinction between these two types of
generalists is not only important for theoretical
reasons but also in clarifying the confusion in
the literature regarding the very definition of
generalists (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 2004; cf.
Hannan, Carroll, & Po´los, 2002a,b). What is clear
from the literature is that the generalism-
specialism distinction refers to the extent of
variance in resource utilization (i.e., niche
width: Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Dobrev et al.,
2002). The confusion results from the fact that,
depending on the industry setting, scholars
have sometimes equated generalism with (sup-
ply-side) multiproduct strategies, whereas in
other cases their single-product counterparts
have been studied, without explicitly treating
the differences and similarities between both
types of generalists. For instance, in the auto-
mobile industry studies (Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan,
2001; Dobrev et al., 2002), generalism is defined
as technological niche width, operationalized as
the range of engine capacity in terms of horse-
power across all models produced by a firm at a
given point in time (multiproduct case). In the
American brewing industry case (Carroll &
Swaminathan, 2000), however, the large mass-
producing brewers are considered to be gener-
alists (single-product case). What unifies these
cases, in our view, is that both types of organi-
zations maximize their market reach by trying to
cover a broad niche (i.e., niche width). The dif-
ference is that they use different strategies to
accomplish this: product segmentation through
differentiated products vis-a`-vis appeal maxi-
mization with standardized products.
Because the multiproduct generalists straddle
different market segments, some might prefer to
refer to this form as polymorphist. Indeed, in
Hannan and Freeman’s original contribution,
polymorphists are defined as a special type of
generalism where different organizations con-
federate to form an “amalgamated holding com-
pany” (1977: 955). Similarly, polymorphists in
Usher’s (1999) framework are multiunit organiza-
tions with locally adapted products and ser-
vices. We, however, think that, in this article,
adding another ideal-type form would unneces-
sarily increase complexity for two reasons.
First, the theoretical boundary of our resource-
based perspective is a single market/industry
by definition. Within such a narrow setting, gen-
eralism and polymorphism are both defined in
terms of niche-width coverage and, therefore,
are not qualitatively different. Specifically,
polymorphism is only an extreme case of gener-
alism. Examples of such extreme cases are In-
bev and Toyota. The former, which calls itself
the “world’s local brewer,” combines the mass
production of pilsner beer with the craft of brew-
ing an impressive number of locally adapted
specialty beers and, as a result, literally covers
the whole market. Toyota has a similar strategy,
marketing cars for the low- to high-end niches of
the market, including the luxury segment with
Lexus. When one studies multiple markets/
industries, it might be more useful to distinguish
generalists from polymorphists. In that case,
polymorphism could be equated with diversifi-
cation.
The second, more pragmatic reason is that in
prior empirical work, as mentioned above, both
types of generalism have been used inter-
changeably. For the sake of clarity and continu-
ity, we prefer to follow this tradition. Combining
both dimensions (single-product versus multi-
product operation and narrow versus broad
niche width) produces a four-way typology of
organizational forms relating to resource utili-
zation and product portfolio strategies: single-
product and multiproduct specialists and gener-
alists, as presented in Table 3.
Although the distinction between single-
product and multiproduct specialists is theoret-
ically less important, it is obvious that special-
ists too can opt for a multiproduct strategy. A
good example is the flexible job shop type of
organization making products adapted to spe-
cific consumer specifications.
TABLE 3
Four Ideal-Type Organizational Resource
Strategies
Niche
Product
Single Multiple
Narrow Single-product
specialist
Multiproduct
specialist
Broad Single-product
generalist
Multiproduct
generalist
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MARKET FORMS
Before putting the pieces of the resource
space/exploitation economies–market structure/
organizational form linkages together, we intro-
duce three theoretical constraints that limit the
number of possible linkages. Specifically, these
constraints a priori exclude combinations that
are unlikely to occur for theoretical reasons.
Constraint 1 (resource homogeneity):
In a homogeneous resource space,
high resource similarity sets limits on
an organization’s portfolio breadth to
the extent that scope economies are
beyond reach.
Constraint 2 (resource heterogeneity):
In a heterogeneous resource space
without a center, high resource dis-
similarity sets limits on an organiza-
tion’s size to the extent that scale
economies are beyond reach.
Constraint 3 (tailed resource space):
Center-periphery segmentation only
occurs in tailed resource spaces, with
a single peak or with multiple peaks.
Constraint 1 states that meaningful scope
economies can only arise if the resource space
features sufficient heterogeneity. Therefore, we
can exclude scope economies in the case of a
condensed resource space. Otherwise, the mul-
tiproduct or multiunit organization comes with
pointless and costly complexity that is not re-
flected in resource space segmentation (Hannan
& Freeman, 1977). Conversely, Constraint 2 un-
derscores that it is unlikely to have meaningful
scale economies when the resource space fea-
tures a rectangular distribution. The reason is
that reaping scale economies requires stan-
dardization, which is not feasible when the re-
sources are heterogeneously distributed, with-
out relatively large market pockets with similar
tastes. Constraint 3 makes explicit that a market
center–market periphery distinction only
emerges if the resource space features a (single
or multiple) peak-tail structure, implying an un-
even distribution of resource mass (Pe´li & Noote-
boom, 1999).
Combining Constraints 1 to 3 with Tables 1 to
3s typologies provides the basis of a resource-
based theory of market form. The theory con-
nects resource space features to market struc-
tures and organizational forms in six steps,
which produces eight cases of equilibrium mar-
ket forms. This six-step model is provided in
Figure 3.
Condensed resource spaces (Cases 1 and 2)
are associated with concentrated or fragmented
market structures. With resource homogeneity
and scale economies (Case 1), on the one hand,
a limited set of large firms will occupy a market
in which price competition dominates over prod-
FIGURE 3
Six-Step Model with Eight Cases
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uct differentiation. The key to competitive suc-
cess is the exploitation of scale economies
through installation of large-MES facilities. In
the extreme, this may result in a natural monop-
oly.18 Often, depending on the relative magni-
tudes of the demand curve and MES, Bertrand-
like oligopolies emerge (Baumol et al., 1982).
That is, if the size of the market on the demand
side is small vis-a`-vis the supply side’s MES,
only a limited number of oligopolists can oper-
ate viably. Examples are many mineral mining
markets, where issues of cost, scale, and price
dominate competition.
Proposition 1: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a condensed
resource space and if the market’s
supply side features overall scale
economies, then large single-product
generalists will prevail in equilibrium
in a concentrated market structure.
With resource homogeneity and scale disecon-
omies (Case 2), on the other hand, the market
structure is fragmented, since a large number of
small firms serve the market in the absence of a
large-MES technology. This is the classic case of
perfect competition or high-density perfect con-
testability (Baumol et al., 1982). Here, scale dis-
economies prevent firms from growing large so
that a large number of firms compete for custom-
ers on the basis of price only, given product
homogeneity. An example is the taxi market in
large cities.
Proposition 2: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a condensed
resource space and if the market’s
supply side features overall scale dis-
economies, then small single-product
generalists will prevail in equilibrium
in a fragmented market structure.
Note that in both ideal-type Cases 1 and 2, the
sustainable firms in equilibrium are all efficient
replicas of each other.
Rectangular resource spaces (Cases 3 and 4)
produce concentrated or uniform market struc-
tures, depending on whether scope economies
are present. If scope economies are present
(Case 3), on the one hand, such economies can
be reaped by those organizations that straddle
the pockets of demand. Here, multiproduct gen-
eralists are likely to flourish, outcompeting local
specialists because of their cost advantage,
where the optimal multiproduct portfolio de-
pends on the nature and size of the scope econ-
omies, as explained in the multiproduct oligo-
poly version of perfect contestability theory
(Baumol et al., 1982). Under such conditions,
large multiproduct generalists can benefit from
shared benefits (e.g., brand names) or costs (e.g.,
efficient overhead) to outcompete their special-
ist counterparts. An example is supermarket
chain competition in the shopping mall market.
Proposition 3: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a rectangular
resource space and if the market’s
supply side features overall scope
economies, then large multiproduct
generalists will prevail in equilibrium
in a concentrated market structure.
If scope economies are absent (Case 4), on the
other hand, the dissimilar resources cannot be
combined in multiresource facilities without ex-
ploitation sacrifices. That is, the different re-
source pockets are all associated with unique
MES entities, while the combination of different
resource sets comes with scope diseconomies.
The result is competition for sustainable posi-
tions by searching for local (quasi-)monopolies.
This type of rivalry is related to monopolistic
competition (Eaton & Lipsey, 1989), localized
competition (Baum & Mezias, 1992), and niche
packing (Pe´li & Nooteboom, 1999), the market
being occupied by tightly packed single-product
specialists. In other words, the so-called biolog-
ical compression hypothesis applies in rectan-
gular resource spaces without scope economies.
This hypothesis says that competition usually
acts to reduce the array of habitats or patches
used by a species (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967).
The result is that every organization eventually
specializes to serve niches with minimal over-
lap with other niches. A classic example is Ho-
telling’s (1929) case of the spatial distribution of
ice-selling outlets on a sunny beach.
Proposition 4: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a rectangular
18 Natural monopoly may emerge in a market without
government protection. For this to happen, the market’s de-
mand curve must cross the monopolist’s cost curve in or at
the left-hand side of the MES. That is, total demand is so
small and/or scale economies are so large that only a single
firm can viably operate in the market.
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resource space and if the market’s
supply side features overall scope dis-
economies, then small single-product
specialists will prevail in equilibrium
in a uniform market structure.
Tailed resource spaces (Cases 5 to 8) are as-
sociated with widely diverging outcomes, the
equilibrium market structure depending on the
specific features of scale and scope economies
within and across different market segments.
For the sake of brevity, we focus only on scale/
scope economies in the market center (yes or no)
and center-periphery scope economies (yes or
no), ignoring the presence or absence of exploi-
tation economies in the periphery. Hence, in this
paper, multiproduct specialists are not consid-
ered. Case 5 is a concentrated market structure
where the presence of exploitation economies
throughout the product space allows firms to
develop very broad niche-width strategies, in
the extreme resulting in a multiproduct general-
ist monopoly. This is multiproduct oligopoly per-
fect contestability theory (Baumol et al., 1982),
again, although now focusing on the case where
the size of the niches for different products dif-
fers considerably. Here, the multiproduct gener-
alist is able to reap both scale or scope econo-
mies in the market center, as well as scope
economies throughout the center-periphery
product space. So, multiproduct generalists now
can offer a product portfolio with which they
can reach all corners of the resource space,
living in the best of both worlds. An example
is the motorcycle industry, in which manufac-
turers tend to produce a wide range of horse-
power (cc) models.
Proposition 5: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a tailed re-
source space and if the market’s sup-
ply side features center exploitation
economies and center-periphery
scope economies, then large multi-
product generalists will prevail in
equilibrium in a concentrated market
structure.
A particularly interesting case is the dual
market structure (Case 6). Here, generalists, with
their strategy of maximizing market reach, grav-
itate toward the center of the market because of
the presence of exploitation economies. This in-
duces tough size-based escalation of competi-
tion for dominance in the market center. During
this process, pockets of demand in the market
periphery are ignored. As a result, the center of
the market, on the one hand, will be dominated
by large scale-exploiting, single-product gener-
alists (in the case of center scale economies) or
scope-driven, multiproduct generalists (in the
case of center scope economies) that benefit
from the large-MES advantages that can be ex-
ploited in the market center. In the market pe-
riphery, on the other hand, small single-product
specialists will occupy the local pockets of re-
source space that the dominant generalists fail
to exploit because of the absence of center-
periphery scope economies. Here, a dual market
structure will emerge in which concentration
and density are positively correlated. Two sim-
ilar theories exist explaining the process toward
such dual market rivalry (Boone & van Wittel-
oostuijn, 2004): OE’s resource-partitioning theory
(Carroll, 1985) and IO’s investment escalation or
sunk cost theory (Sutton, 1991).
Resource-partitioning theory focuses on the
importance of scale economies in the market
center, which trigger escalation of competition
among single-product generalists. The core of
the theory predicts that competition for the mar-
ket’s center among large scale-driven general-
ists opens up opportunities for small differenti-
ation-oriented specialists to occupy the deserted
periphery outside the market’s center. This im-
plies that the theory tells two related but differ-
ent stories of competitive rivalry (Boone et al.,
2002, 2004). The first story relates to the familiar
argument about oligopoly-like rivalry in a prod-
uct homogeneity market with a large MES. In
such an environment, the search for scale in-
creases market center concentration up to the
point where the scale advantages are fully ex-
ploited by installing large-MES facilities. The
second part of the resource-partitioning story
pertains to what happens in the market periph-
ery. The assumption is that the large center gen-
eralists cannot exploit the differentiation oppor-
tunities in the market periphery without cost
sacrifices, which implies the assumption of cen-
ter-periphery scope diseconomies. Such scope
diseconomies may result from a variety of dis-
advantages, from reputation bottlenecks to
stretching costs (Carroll et al., 2002). By compet-
itive necessity, the center’s generalists must
leave the fringe to small-MES peripheral spe-
cialists. This implies that the specialists’ perfor-
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mance in the market periphery is enhanced by
the toughness of the generalists’ rivalry for the
market center. An example is the brewing indus-
try, where national generalists compete against
local brew pub and microbrewery specialists
(Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).
The investment escalation story emphasizes
the alternative role of scope economies in mar-
ket center rivalry. By heavily investing in adver-
tising and/or R&D, the leading oligopolists seek
to establish brand recognition in the market
center. The heavy investment in objective
(through R&D) and/or subjective (through adver-
tising) product quality has to be recouped by
conquering a large market center share. In fact,
this implies that the high-mass center of the
resource distribution is segmented into niches,
where multiproduct generalists struggle for
dominance. So, again, surviving generalists are
large market players, although for different rea-
sons, since competition for the market center is
now driven by multiproduct differentiation
(scope) rather than single-product cost effi-
ciency (scale). As the large leading market cen-
ter oligopolists (multiproduct generalists) accu-
mulate impressive investment expenditures, the
small following firms are left behind to supply
the price-sensitive market fringe with low-
priced noninvestment products. Overall, then,
the investment escalation story is the mirror im-
age of the resource-partitioning argument
(Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1995, 2004). An ex-
ample is the frozen food market, with premium-
price/high-quality multiproduct generalists and
low-price/low-quality single-product specialists
(Geroski & Vlassopoulos, 1991).
Proposition 6: (a) If the market’s de-
mand side is characterized by a tailed
resource space and if the market’s
supply side features center scale econ-
omies and center-periphery scope dis-
economies, then large single-product
generalists and small single-product
specialists will prevail in equilibrium
in a dual market structure; (b) if the
market’s demand side is characterized
by a tailed resource space and if the
market’s supply side features center
scope economies and center-periph-
ery scope diseconomies, then large
multiproduct generalists and small
single-product specialists will prevail
in equilibrium in a dual market struc-
ture.
In Case 7, organizations are able to benefit
from center-periphery scope economies, but not
from center scale economies. As a result, firms
cannot develop and sustain a large market
share in the market center. Given center-
periphery scope economies, firms will try to
build a small market share in the center, to-
gether with a position in the periphery. The end
result is a uniform market structure with small
multiproduct generalists that straddle, to a lim-
ited extent, the center and periphery with mul-
tiple products. This is a special case of multi-
product oligopoly theory with small-MES
technologies (Baumol et al., 1982). An example is
the market for bicycles, where many smaller
multiproduct firms are producing both general-
purpose and small-niche bikes.
Proposition 7: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a tailed re-
source space and if the market’s sup-
ply side features center exploitation
diseconomies and center-periphery
scope economies, then multiproduct
generalists will operate in a uniform
market structure.
Finally, Case 8, without any exploitation
economies, is similar to Case 4, except that the
market structure will be much more fragmented
than the uniform structure emerging in Case 4.
This is because many identical small-MES firms
will eventually locate in the center, raising or-
ganizational density ceteris paribus. This case
resembles the n-firm variant of vertical differen-
tiation games (Sutton, 1998), where competition
evolves around quality differences. An example
is a local building market, where many smaller
firms offer the service to build houses that differ
in terms of price and quality, either in the center
or the periphery.
Proposition 8: If the market’s demand
side is characterized by a tailed re-
source space and if the market’s sup-
ply side features center and center-
periphery exploitation diseconomies,
then small single-product generalists
or specialists will operate in a frag-
mented market structure.
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ENDOGENIZING THE THEORY
Firm conduct (and so the voluntarist dimen-
sion) may enter into the resource-based story of
market form through two routes. First, firms may
seize the opportunities coming from the market’s
resource space features. In this case, the re-
source space features (and, thus, market struc-
ture) are still exogenous to the market. Here,
many underlying real-world mechanisms are
easy to imagine: distributive shape changes at
the demand side are driven by history-depen-
dent shifts in tastes (e.g., the impressive pene-
tration of television has dramatically changed
the nature and pace of consumer trends, chang-
ing the nature of the newspaper); many supply-
side exploitation economies arise from public
investment programs in technology (e.g., with-
out NASA products, the aircraft industry would
have taken a different course); and resource
space mass and, thus, market size or carrying
capacity increase all the time as a result of
population and/or wealth growth (e.g., in the
Western world, supermarket chains would be
nowhere without the wide spread of prosperity).
Of course, with such exogenous shifts in re-
source space features, market structures change
accordingly.19
Second, firms may change resource space fea-
tures through strategically investing in resource
space shape and mass, as well as scale and
scope economies. Here, resource space and ex-
ploitation economies’ features (and, thus, mar-
ket structures and organizational forms) are en-
dogenous to the market, implying that an
assumptional boundary of the theory is endog-
enized. Of course, this feedback mechanism
abounds in IO and OE studies. In IO, this is
particularly clear from the reciprocal firm con-
duct–market structure causalities in IO’s struc-
ture-conduct-performance framework (Scherer &
Ross, 1990) and the crucial sunk cost (irrevers-
ible investment or strategic commitment) no-
tion(s) in modern IO’s game theory20 (Tirole,
1988). In OE, resource-partitioning theory offers
an example (Carroll, 1985), since there the argu-
ment is that the investment in scale by general-
ists in the market center triggers entry by spe-
cialists in the market periphery (Boone et al.,
2002, 2004).
A number of examples may illustrate this ar-
gument. First, the distributive shape of the re-
source space is heavily influenced by the firms’
investment in advertising or R&D (Sutton, 1991).
That is, by manipulating customers’ perception
(advertising) or introducing new products (R&D),
firms can give birth to resource space niches (or
even whole resource spaces) that target existing
demand-side utilities differently (e.g., airplanes
offer another way of long-distance travel, rather
than cars, ships, or trains) or create new de-
mand-side needs (e.g., internet technology
brings a wide range of new products to the mar-
ket).21 An OE-related example is implied by
niche-packing theory (Pe´li & Nooteboom, 1999).
Here, an argument is that entry emerges if the
number of product features increases. So, if a
firm introduces a product innovation that adds a
new characteristic (e.g., safety issues in the car
industry), then density is likely to increase as a
consequence of an entry wave.
Second, many firm-level R&D programs are
designed to increase exploitation economics by
focusing on process technologies (Schmalensee
& Willig, 1989). For example, by improving pre-
vailing or inventing new production technolo-
gies, many firms have been able to move the
MES upward. Similarly, organizational innova-
tions (e.g., American divisionalization and Jap-
anese leanness) may push the MES forward. In
IO, studies of market-level innovativeness
19 In empirical work these exogenous shifts are generally
taken on board by introducing a carefully selected set of
time-dependent dummies or covariates (either by plugging
in ad hoc time dummies or by incorporating recognizable
historical shock or trend variables such as political turmoil
and GDP measures).
20 Game theory is the conceptual and mathematical tool-
kit for the study of interaction among parties—or players—
with conflicting interests. In modern IO, equilibria are cal-
culated by applying game-theoretic concepts, such as the
Nash equilibrium, to analyze competition. A Nash equilib-
rium is defined (in the two-player context) as the pair of
strategies from which neither player deviates because a
unilateral change of strategy does not produce a payoff
improvement. That is, each player i’s strategy x is his/her
best reply to rival j’s strategy y in the sense that xmaximizes
i’s payoff, given j’s strategy y (where i,j  1,2 and i  j). This
concept and its many extensions are used to analyze a wide
variety of games, assuming different rules (e.g., finite or
infinite horizon) and structures (e.g., the number of players
and the type of information regime).
21 The opposite may occur as well. For example, a network
investment reduces the demand side’s distributive resource
heterogeneity by restricting product variety through impos-
ing an incompatibility cost (Katz & Shapiro, 1985).
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abound, linking market structure features to
firms’ R&D strategies (van Cayseele, 1998).
Third, the size of market demand may in-
crease as a result of product advertising or reg-
ulation lobbying efforts (Boone & van Witteloos-
tuijn, 1995). For instance, the public good nature
of many advertising programs implies that an
individual firm’s promotion investment or a joint
industry-level campaign may well raise indus-
try demand as a whole.
THE NEXT STEP
A resource-based theory of market form may tie
together the fragmented theory pieces that have
been developed in the organization sciences do-
main. In this article a typology of three ideal-type
resource spaces has been linked to similar classi-
fications of market structures and organizational
forms. This exercise has produced an integrated
perspective on market form in which different
pieces of theory can be nicely compared and com-
bined in order to produce a list of ideas and
propositions as to the resource space–exploi-
tation economies–market structure–organiza-
tional form linkages.
Table 4 summarizes the core of a resource-
based theory of market form. With the limited
number of three ideal-type classifications of
market structures, resource spaces, and organi-
zational forms, different theory pieces nicely fit
into the resource-based puzzle. Note that the
lists of competitive rules and theory pieces only
present representative examples. It is clear that
the information on organizational forms in equi-
librium (column 4 in Table 4) allows one to iden-
tify the true market form (column 6) underlying
the market structures presented in column 3.
Additionally, we briefly discussed the need to
endogenize the assumptional boundaries of the
theory by integrating the firm conduct–resource
space interplay in future work. The preliminary
exercise of endogenizing resource space
changes and exploitation economies we pre-
sented above illustrates how resource-based
reasoning may be applied to move the theory
TABLE 4
The Eight Cases Summarized
Case
Number
Resource
Space
Market
Structure
Organizational Form
in Equilibrium Theory Fragment Market Form
1 Condensed Concentrated Large single-product
generalists
● Bertrand and Cournot
oligopoly
Concentrated single-product
oligopoly
● Natural monopoly
2 Condensed Fragmented Small single-product
generalists
● Perfect competition Fragmented single-product
contestability
● High-density perfect
contestability
3 Rectangular Concentrated Large multiproduct
generalists
Multiproduct oligopoly Concentrated multiproduct
oligopoly
4 Rectangular Uniform Single-product specialists ● Lancasterian location
games
Uniform single-product
competition
● Monopolistic
competition
● Niche-packing theory
5 Tailed Concentrated Large multiproduct
generalists
Low-density perfect
contestability
Concentrated multiproduct
contestability
6 Tailed Dual ● Multiproduct generalists
and single-product
specialists
● Investment-escalation
theory
● Dual multiproduct fringe
oligopoly
● Single-product generalists
and single-product
specialists
● Resource-partitioning
theory
● Dual single-product fringe
oligopoly
7 Tailed Uniform Small multiproduct
generalists
Vertical differentiation
games
Uniform multiproduct
competition
8 Tailed Fragmented Small single-product
generalists and specialists
Special case of 4 Fragmented single-product
competition
Note: We assume market size to be equal across cases, ceteris paribus.
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beyond the ideal-type equilibrium-oriented
classification schemes.
Resource-based reasoning suggests that the
key to understanding market structure evolution
is to dig deeper into the underlying processes of
resource space changes (cf. Boone et al., 2002).
Such changes may be endogenous or exogenous
to the market. For sure, we are still far from such
a full theory of market structure evolution. How-
ever, the resource-based apparatus may help
put the scattered evidence in perspective. In this
context, the ideal-type resource space–exploita-
tion economies–market structure–organization-
al form linkages reflect the equilibrium targets
from or toward which markets evolve: much IO
involves the study of equilibria, whereas OE is
primarily concerned with dynamic processes.
The resource-based theory of market form pro-
vides a list of resource space–exploitation econ-
omies–market structure–organizational form
linkages that offers a stepping-stone for predict-
ing market structure changes and organization-
al form fates from resource space movements or
exploitation economies changes, which may be
either imposed exogenously or induced endog-
enously. By the end of the day, however, unrav-
eling the many thinkable evolutionary paths is
an empirical matter.
Of course, this article’s argument offers just
the first step in the development of a full-blown
resource-based theory of market structure and
organizational form. We have not addressed
several important issues. First, one complica-
tion relates to the device of inventing typologies
with ideal-type cases on the basis of simple
two-dimensional characterizations, which is
very helpful in the process of developing and
communicating a theory. Apart from the ideal-
type resource distribution–exploitation econo-
mies–market structure–organizational form tri-
angles, many hybrid cases can be observed in
the business world. For example, many observ-
ers claim that modern IT implies that the classic
scale-versus-scope dilemma is history by now.
How do the scale-scope forces work out in high-
technology industries? Additionally, market
concentration, organizational density, distribu-
tive shape, and exploitation (dis)economies
have all been explored by measuring continu-
ous proxies in a wide variety of industry studies.
Here, though, the eight-cases typology and the
underlying resource features may guide formu-
lation of the hypotheses and interpretation of
the findings.
Second, much organization sciences work is
dominated by the quest for an ultimate expla-
nation of organizational performance. For exam-
ple, IO has a long history of studying the deter-
minants of firm profitability, whereas the core of
OE is devoted to explaining organizational sur-
vival. A key question, therefore, is how the eight
ideal-type market forms relate to the issue of
organizational performance (longevity and prof-
itability). For instance, what determines the per-
formance of different firm categories (e.g., small
versus large) in different market structure re-
gimes? It is clear that the resource-based per-
spective provides a useful framework for hy-
pothesis generation. For instance, in the dual
market case (Case 6) we expect that both size (in
the market center) and specialization are impor-
tant determinants of firm performance simulta-
neously (Boone et al., 2004). In addition, generalist
scale competition and resulting concentrationwill
enhance specialist performance in tailed resource
spaces, as has been confirmed in many empirical
settings (Boone et al., 2002; Carroll & Hannan,
2000). Take another market setting. In heteroge-
neous resource distributions without a market
center (Case 4), we expect that, following the prin-
ciple of competitive compression, firms will do
well to minimize niche overlap and to limit the
range of their product portfolio. Such elaborations
illustrate what the value added of the resource-
based perspective may prove to be in the theoret-
ical and empirical arenas.
To explore the full potential of the resource-
based theory of market form, empirical studies
into the underlying (changes in) environmental
resource space features in a wide range of in-
dustries are particularly promising (for an ex-
ample, see Boone et al., 2002). The proof of the
theoretical pudding is, after all, in the empirical
eating. In this context, there is a need to focus on
a wide range of differently structured industries,
taking on board measures of resource space
changes. Fair enough, the data needed for a
full-fledged test of the theory are indeed difficult
to collect. In the organization sciences domain,
detailed time-series data about environmental
resource space features are the exception rather
than the rule. Ideally, the data set should con-
tain detailed information as to the distribution
of environmental resources (at the industry
level) and the exploitation (dis)advantages
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(scale and scope) of their operation (at the firm
level) over a prolonged time period. The likely
reward of this demanding but challenging em-
pirical research agenda, however, is a deep-
ened understanding of market form evolution.
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